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INTRODUCTION
"I cannot remember a time," the novelist Robertson Davies
wrote, "when I did not take it as understood that everybody has at
least two, if not twenty-two, sides to him."' Davies' comment gives us
a convenient point of departure to explore the relationship between
law and cyberspace. Anyone who spends a significant amount of time
on the Internet knows that the Net has at least two, if not twenty-two,
sides to it. Auction sites, chat rooms, instant messaging, knowledge
networks, and Net radio are but a few of the Internet's constantly
expanding capabilities for communication, commerce, and social
interaction. It seems remarkable, then, that at a time when we are
seeking to understand and enhance a medium of such Protean charac-
ter, so much of our thinking about the Internet has remained bound
to-and bounded by-the same few metaphors that have dominated
Internet culture over the past decade.
No metaphor has been more pervasive in this regard than the
concept of cyberspace as the "Wild West." Early visionaries of the
Internet characterized it as an "electronic frontier, '"2 comparing its
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1. ROBERTSON DAVIES, FIFTH BuSINESS 78 (1970).
2. See Mitchell Kapor and John Perry Barlow, Across the Electronic Frontier (July 10, 1990)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publications/Mitch Kapor/electronicfrontier.eff>. See also
JOHN SEABROOK, DEEPER 17, 272-73 (1997). The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which
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explorers to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pioneers who set-
tled the American West.3 Those comparisons have continued to the
present day, both within the hacker community4 and in popular writ-
ing about the Internet.' Some Internet visionaries have also used the
Western metaphor as a rhetorical device to challenge the appropriate-
ness of governmentally imposed law in cyberspace.6 More recently,
government authorities, concerned about the spread of criminal activ-
ity involving the Internet, have invoked the Wild West metaphor to
argue for the rule of law in cyberspace.7 Journalists and popular
Kapor and Barlow created, has continued to perpetuate the "electronic frontier" metaphor. See
Electronic Frontier Foundation (visited November 25, 2000) <http://www.eff.org>.
3. ROBERT B. GELMAN ET AL., PROTECTING YOURSELF ONLINE xviii (1998).
4. For example, one hacker quoted in recent news accounts about computer crime prosecu-
tions identifies himself only as "Bronc Buster." See Lynn Burke, MostHateD to Plead Most
Guilty, WIRED NEWS (March 29, 2000) <http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,35264,00.html>.
5. See Ted Hamilton, Who Is That Masked Man?, ZD NET UK (April 6, 2000)
<http://www/zdnet.co.uk/news/2000/13/ns-14656.html>; Sandra Stewart, Whatever Hap-
pened to the EFF?, THE STANDARD (March 13, 2000) <http://www.thestandard.com/article/
article .print/1 .1153,12707,00.html>.
6. David Johnson, for example, viewed legislative constraints on access to online personal
data as little better than barbed wire fences in cyberspace, that would create "the prospect of a
range war over ownership of data .. " David R. Johnson, Barbed Wire Fences in Cyberspace:
The Threat Posed by Calls for Ownership of Transactional Information (Apr. 4, 1994) <http://
www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual-property/cyber-barbwire-johnson.article>. John Perry Barlow
offered an even harsher depiction of cyberspace-as-Wild-West, in which the rule of law had no
legitimacy:
There is a cycle of frontier inhabitation which has usually gone like this: Misfits and
dreamers, rejected by or rejecting society, are pushed out into the margins. There
they set up camp and maintain what little order they want in it by unwritten codes,
the honor of thieves, the Code of the West.
Despite their usual haplessness, they discover resources and start exploiting them.
Burghers and boosters back in the civilized regions hear of these discoveries. Settlers,
a milder sort, come in with their women and children and are repelled by the savagery
and license of their predecessors, whether mountain men, prospectors or Indians.
They send for troops, they elect representatives, they pass laws, and, pretty soon,
they've created another civilized simulation of certainty.
Already we can find the usual Christian soldiers massing at the borders of Cyber-
space.... [T]he government is preparing to place this new frontier under the rule of
law. Whether the pioneers already there want it or not.
John Perry Barlow, Jack In, Young Pioneer! (Aug. 11, 1994) <http://www.eff.org/pub/
Infrastructure/virtualfrontier-barlow-eff.article>.
.7. Recently, for example, at a conference between Internet industry representatives and
senior political and law enforcement officials from the Group of Eight (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States), a senior representative of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police deemed the Internet "akin to the Wild, Wild West in its law-
lessness." John-Thor Dahlburg, G-8 Seeks Unity on Policing Internet, Los ANGELES TIMES,
May 18, 2000, at C3. For indications of the ubiquity of this view, see, e.g., John Makulowich,
Wild West of the Information Age, WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY (March 22, 1999) <http://
www.wtonline.com/voll3no24/briefs/433-l .html> (quoting remarks of Attorney General Janet
Reno that "[w]e cannot allow cyberspace to become the Wild West of the information age");
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writers have also tried to use the Wild West metaphor in writing
about Internet crime,8 sometimes with results that range from the
laborious9 to the unintentionally comic."0
The reasons for the popularity of the cyberspace-as-Wild-West
metaphor are easy to understand. The myths and legends of the Old
West are so thoroughly infused in American history and culture that
they readily come to mind whenever we begin to explore any new
frontier, whether real or virtual. The myths and legends that come
first to our minds, however, may depend largely upon the way we
define ourselves in relation to the Internet.
Internet visionaries presumably found the Western metaphor
appealing because their original notion of cyberspace accorded so well
with the popular conception of the Old West. For them, the early
Internet, like the Old West, "beckoned to the imagination as a place
unregulated and uncivilized, whose inhabitants lived beyond the reach
of law and the constraints of polite behavior."'" Their cyberspace, in
Interpol Urged to Stop Internet from Becoming "Wild West," WJIN NEWS (Nov. 8, 1999)
http://www.wjin.net/html/news/3019.htm> (quoting Toshinori Kanemoto, President of
Interpol, as saying that "We should not make the Internet a Wild West"); Polly Sprenger, U.K.
Cyberspace Is No 'Wild West,' THE STANDARD (Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.
thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,6535,00.html> (quoting Patricia Hewitt, the United
Kingdom's Minister for e-commerce, as saying that "[w]e don't accept that cyberspace is some
Wild West frontier where law enforcement and the sheriff should keep out"); Elliot Zaret, FTC
to Launch E-Commerce Division (Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.zdnet.com/filters/
printerfriendly/0,6061,2245064-2,00.html> (quoting Sheila Anthony, Commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission, as saying that the FTC would take "law enforcement actions to stop
the Internet from turning into the 'wild west' of advertising and marketing."). The title of the
U.S. Department of Justice's recent report on unlawful conduct on the Intemet reflects this
continuing reliance on the Western metaphor. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER (2000).
8. Much of this writing plays off the popular image of the Wild West sheriff. See, e.g.,
JEFF GOODELL, THE CYBERTHIEF AND THE SAMURAI xvi (1996); Charles Doyle, Wanted -
Cyber-Sheriff To Tame New Wild West, THE GUARDIAN (March 29, 1999) <http://www.
infowar.com/law/99/law033199bj.shtml> (printed March 3, 2000).
9. One journalist, in writing about identity theft on the Internet, noted "that the United
States in particular has become a Wild West for mischievous mouseslingers." Tyler Hamilton,
The Identity Thieves-Losing Face, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL (June 5, 1999) <http://www.
infowar.com/class_1/99/class_1050699a-j.shtml>.
10. "Like the gunslinging sheriffs of old who introduced order to the West," one journalist
wrote, in a flurry of mixed metaphors, "federal agencies are increasingly wading into the digital
landscape and throwing around their regulatory weight." Doug Brown, Bulked- Up FTC: Let's
Get Busy, INTER@ACTIVE WEEK (Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/filters/
printerfriendly/0,6061,2440841-35,00.html>.
11. TED MORGAN, A SHOVEL OF STARS 13 (1995). As Jane Tompkins has noted, the
West
functions as a symbol of freedom, and of the opportunity for conquest. It seems to
offer escape from the conditions of life in modem industrial society: from a mecha-
nized existence, economic dead ends, social entanglements, unhappy personal rela-
tions, political injustice. The desire to change places also signals a powerful need for
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short, was most attractive because of its lawlessness; it was a place
they saw as unbounded by stultifying legal restrictions.
Law enforcement officials, by contrast, typically find the Wild
West metaphor disquieting. For them, it reflects the more malign
form of lawlessness for which the Old West, in varying degrees,
earned its reputation: an absence of generally accepted legal rules to
protect the citizenry and lack of effective legal institutions to enforce
those rules.12 In much of the Old West between 1865 and 1890, a
respect for law and an acceptance of institutions drawn from Anglo-
American law were slow to flourish. Government authorities today
are probably mindful of that fact when they see in the electronic
frontier a potential for the same kinds of disorder that affected the
Western frontier.
We need to remember that when we use metaphor to describe or
analyze a problem, metaphor inevitably has seductive qualities that
can lead us seriously astray. 3 While metaphor is pervasive in modern
speech and writing, its main use is poetical rather than analytical. 4
Metaphor swiftly reduces complex ideas by synthesizing two ideas or
images "into a simple concrete equivalent."'" This power makes
metaphor especially well-suited to poetic imagery and especially ill-
suited to analytical description. 6 More than other figures of speech, it
tempts us to confuse similarity with identity and to define the problem
we are studying in terms of the metaphor we have chosen. These
seductive qualities are particularly strong with a metaphor as powerful
and pervasive as the Western metaphor has been in American culture.
We must nonetheless resist the temptation to use Wild West
metaphors when we examine the relationship between law and the
Internet. Metaphors as laden with myth and popular belief as "the
Old West" or "the Wild West" are unlikely to either illuminate
particular concepts or express meanings more clearly than abstract
language can. 7 At a time when law and legal institutions are straining
self-transformation. The desert light and the desert space, the creak of saddle leather
and the sun beating down, the horses' energy and force-these things promise a trans-
lation of the self into something purer and more authentic, more intense, more real.
JANE TOMPKINS, WEST OF EVERYTHING 4 (1992).
12. In some cowtowns known for their violence, a frontier marshal's tenure lasted, on the
average, about two weeks. See DON WORCESTER, THE CHISHOLM TRAIL 130 (1980).
13. See, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 1 (1989).
14. HERBERT READ, ENGLISH PROSE STYLE 23 (1952). See I.A. RICHARDS, PRINCIPLES
OF LITERARY CRITICISM 240 (1925).
15. READ, supra note 14, at 23.
16. Id. at 23-24.
17. See id. at 26.
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to keep pace with the Internet's rapid growth and development,18 it is
clear that such resistance will not be easy. The legal profession is
already beginning to propose solutions to legal problems in cyberspace
by insisting on the adoption of a single metaphor that frames the
solutions in terms of false dichotomies.19 The fact remains that the
more we insist on selecting any single metaphor or analogy-not
merely the Wild West-as the correct one for framing complex cyber-
space issues, the more likely we are to select rules that are inadequate,
if not dangerously misleading.
At the same time, there can be considerable heuristic and analyt-
ical value in looking beyond the mythic dimensions of the Wild West
metaphor. Metaphors that illuminate, rather than obscure, ideas and
concepts may have considerable value in analyzing cyberspace issues.
Certain empirically verifiable aspects of the Western experience20
especially those with some relation to the growth of law in the Ameri-
can West-might offer metaphors more likely to illuminate ideas and
expand both our insight into and understanding of cyberspace legal
issues.
But which aspect of the real Western experience might serve that
purpose? To serve as a point of comparison with the Internet, it
should be some form of technology that was not only integral to the
growth and settlement of the West, but also, as the Internet is likely to
do in our time, something that ultimately transformed the West's law,
culture, and character. The telegraph, the transcontinental railroad,
and the six-shooter all were technologies integral to Western expan-
sion. Yet none of them had a more decisive impact on the Old West's
law and culture than a homely, but ultimately ubiquitous, piece of
technology that cowboys sardonically termed "the devil's hatband" 21:
barbed wire.22
In this Article, I maintain that while there is an ongoing conflict
of legal traditions over the desirability of fences in cyberspace, there
are definite virtues in the creation of such fences, so long as we under-
stand the physical, psychological, and moral dimensions of that proc-
18. See, e.g., James Freeman, Washington Tries To Move On Internet Time, FORBES (March
13, 2000) <http://www.forbes.com/200O/03/13/freeman_0313.html>.
19. See, e.g., Jonathan Wallace and Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet,
the Printing Press, and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 711, 712 (1997) (advocating
that the Supreme Court set forth "the operative metaphor for [Internet] freedom of speech and
appl[y] the metaphor in conjunction with an appropriate analogy for the technology" (emphasis
added)).
20. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT AND THE WESTERN
EXPERIENCE (1968).
21. See, e.g., DAVID DERY, COWBOY CULTURE 307-08 (1981).
22. See DON WORCESTER, supra note 12, at xiv.
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ess. Part I will present a brief survey of the history of barbed wire in
the Old West, paying particular attention to the contending legal
traditions that affected the manner and extent of that growth in the
West. These contending legal traditions, which related to "fencing
in" versus "fencing out" cattle, played a key role in the growth of
barbed wire and ultimately in the growth and settlement of the Old
West. Part II will then identify some of the similarities between that
process and the continuing process of conflicting legal traditions in
cyberspace. In particular, I will show that the concepts of "fencing in"
and "fencing out" have continuing vitality and relevance in exploring
the relationship of law and cyberspace. Finally, Part III will examine
the extent to which those concepts have both historical and moral
relevance in that exploration.
I. THE "DEVIL'S HATBAND": A HISTORICAL SURVEY
In the growth and settlement of the Old West, boundary setting
was a process that constituted "the very essence of frontier life."2 To
define the physical territory that one owned, and in some respects, to
define oneself and one's willingness to relate to others beyond that ter-
ritory on the frontier, 4 Western settlers needed some mechanism that
would not only visibly delineate that territory for other settlers, but
also would serve to control the movements of the increasingly vast
herds of cattle.
If we pause for a moment to imagine a segment of barbed wire
fence, we can see that barbed wire had a certain technological elegance
that suited its purposes well. Barbed wire could be quickly produced
in mass quantities and, once installed in the desired location, was both
highly durable and highly effective in its intended uses. Because the
wire presented such a small cross-section to wind and precipitation, it
typically outlasted wood, which was hard to come by in cattle coun-
try.25 Its barbs-and the occasional intervention of "checkline riders"
to keep cattle back from the fencing 26-also made it efficient for
restraining even large herds of cattle.
At the same time, the introduction of barbed wire in the West
exacerbated a clash between two legal traditions, directly implicating
the very nature of Western life and culture. In what had been New
Spain and antebellum Texas and California, Spanish law "had tradi-
23. William Cronon et al., Becoming West: Toward a New Meaning for Western History, in
UNDER AN OPEN SKY: RETHINKING AMERICA'S WESTERN PAST 15 (William Cronon et al.
eds., 1992).
24. See id. 16,18.
25. Id. at 309.
26. See TED MORGAN, supra note 11, at 267.
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tionally held that the landowner must fence his land if he wished to
protect his crops from cattle on the open range. 27 This legal tradition
led to the open-range system of cattle raising, in which multiple
ranchers grazed cattle on unfenced public lands and cooperated with
and helped one another, "particularly at roundup time. ' 28  Conse-
quently, "[tlhe majority of cattlemen, especially in Texas, believed
that farmers should fence their land to keep cattle out. 29
On the other hand, as historian David Dery has explained,
English common law brought to America endorsed a "fence
livestock in" concept, placing the burden of responsibility on the
stock owner to control his livestock .... [A]s increasing num-
bers of settlers began pushing westward into cow country...
[m]ore and more frequently, farmers turned to the law when cat-
tle overran their fields. Both Kansas and Nebraska passed herd
laws making it mandatory for cattlemen to restrain their herds
from wandering at will over the prairies and plains .... The
herd laws ... reflected English common law .... Herd laws
placed the responsibility on the cattlemen, even when cattle
broke through fences or otherwise got loose.3°
While cattlemen deplored the advent of the herd laws and tried
(mostly in vain) to challenge them in courts,3' they had to find a means
of restraining their cattle if they were to comply with those laws. At
the time, the price of board fences in most places was prohibitive-
between $500 and $1,000 a mile in mid-nineteenth century dollars-
so cattlemen resorted to range riders and line riders, to patrol the
boundaries of the ranches and drive back cattle that strayed too close
to the unfenced line.32 This state of affairs left the range mostly open
and the open-range culture relatively intact.
Barbed wire changed all that in the 1870s and 1880s. As settlers
continued to pour into cattle country and cattlemen and farmers alike
found this new technology substantially cheaper than board fencing,33
both groups began erecting barbed-wire fences. In addition, when a
drought of epic proportions struck the West in 1883, water and grass
for grazing became more precious than ever. Cattlemen who lacked
27. DERY, supra note 21, at 310.
28. Id. at 309.
29. Id. at 310.
30. Id. 308-10.
31. Id. at 309.
32. Id. at 310. Richard White, Animals and Enterprise, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 261 (Clyde A. Milner II et al. eds., 1994).
33. The cost of barbed wire fencing might range from $200 to $400 per mile. See DERY,
supra note 21, at 315.
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the foresight to acquire land and water rights fenced in land they did
not own, including public lands and even "farms and small ranches
belonging to other people in an effort to grab every possible acre of
grassland for their cattle."34 Other cattlemen induced their cowboys to
file homestead claims on open range land and, for a price, to turn over
their newly acquired land titles to the cattlemen.3"
The spread of laws requiring cattlemen to fence in land eventu-
ally became, as the United States Supreme Court described it with
astringent understatement, "a subject of agitation."36 The fencing of
unfenced land soon took a destructive turn in many areas.
Fences blocked many public roads, cutting off schools and
churches and interfering with the delivery of the mail. Men
began to cut fences, and soon ranchers were hiring men to do the
job. More than half of the counties in Texas reported the cut-
ting and wrecking of fences and the burning of pasturelands by
late 1883 .... Perhaps half-a-dozen men were killed in battles
between fence cutters and ranchers defending their property. By
the fall of 1883 damage to fences in Texas was estimated at $20
million.37
Decisive government action largely ended fence-cutting and the
overfencing of land. A special session of the Texas legislature made
fence cutting a felony with a maximum penalty of five years imprison-
ment; it also made the knowledgeable unpermitted fencing of public
lands or lands belonging to others a misdemeanor.3" Builders of such
fences were required to remove them within six months. Those who
built fences across public roads were ordered to place gates at 3 mile
intervals and to keep them in good repair.39 Illegal fencing of public
lands continued elsewhere until 1885, when Congress "passed a law
designed to speed prosecution of those who fenced public land"4 and
President Grover Cleveland issued an Executive Order for the
removal of such fencing.4
This survey of barbed wire's introduction into the Old West
suggests at least two themes that directly apply to our consideration of
the relationship between law and cyberspace. The first involves the
conflict of traditions relating to the establishment of boundaries and
34. Id. at 320; White, supra note 32, at 264. See TED MORGAN, supra note 11, at 267.
35. DERY, supra note 21, at 320; White, supra note 32, at 263-64.
36. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890).
37. DERY, supra note 21, at 320-21.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 321.
40. Id. at 325.
41. White, supra note 32, at 265. See WORCESTER, supra note 12, at xvii.
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the importance of the concepts of "fencing in" and "fencing out" in
those traditions. The second involves the nature and impact of the
mechanisms that people adopt to establish those boundaries and
control certain items of value.
II. CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN CYBERSPACE: THE RELEVANCE
OF "FENCING IN" AND "FENCING OUT"
The conflict of traditions in the Old West, as I have described it,
involved ostensibly contradictory legal rules that two sovereigns had
devised in different periods. One rule adjured farmers to fence out
cattle, the other required cattlemen to fence in cattle. Clearly, neither
rule standing alone could claim logical or moral superiority over the
other.42 Choosing one or the other, nonetheless, had two distinct
virtues. First, it provided a settled rule that uniformly applied to all
similarly situated parties. Second, it recognized implicitly that the
potentially conflicting activities of farmers and cattlemen required the
adoption of a rule to address the reciprocal harms that each could
cause to the other's interests. In Coasian terms, society benefited from
the selection of a rule that avoided what that society perceived to be
the more serious harm.43 Both rules also addressed a critical aspect of
harm avoidance or reduction that Coase himself did not address:"
deciding whether society would derive a greater benefit by requiring
one party to restrain that harm (that is, fencing it in), the other party
to exclude it (that is, fencing it out), or some combination thereof.
Likewise, the Internet is experiencing a conflict of traditions that
affects its culture and development. This conflict could be broadly
characterized as legal, in the sense that legal norms and values are
implicated. A more precise characterization would be that the conflict
is between a legal and a nonlegal tradition, rather than two competing
legal traditions as in the Old West.
42. Bernhard Grossfeld has cited the "fencing in"/"fencing out" conflict in the Old West
as an example of "geography [being] more powerful than legal culture or history." BERNHARD
GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 83 (Tony Weir trans.
1990). From the historical evidence cited above, it appears that a combination of technology,
economics, politics, and climate were more decisive than geography in the ultimate selection of
the "fence cattle in" rule.
43. See Ronald A. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). Coase is
a professor of economics, now retired from the University of Chicago, who won the Nobel Prize
in Economics for his seminal work in the field of law and economics. See Anne Swardson, Nobel
Prize in Economics Goes to Univ. of Chicago Professor, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at F1. What
makes his 1960 article on social cost especially pertinent to the present discussion is that, to
examine the problem of reciprocal harm and social cost, Coase chose "the case of straying cattle
which destroy crops growing on neighboring land." Ronald Coase, supra, at 2.
44. See Coase, supra note 43, at 2.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
The legal tradition in this case embodies a set of norms, long
established in various legal systems, that support the making of, and
foster obedience to, legal rules for the creation and enforcement of
boundaries in physical space. This tradition derives its support from
the majority of the public, who have relatively little familiarity with
computing and Internet technology, but who are generally familiar
with laws establishing boundaries and are accustomed to accepting the
utility of boundaries and rules in everyday life.
In contrast, the nonlegal tradition embodies a loosely connected
patchwork of norms, generally libertarian in character, that tend to
disfavor legal rules for cyberspace as much as cowboys did barbed
wire. This tradition derives its support from a comparatively small
minority, who are, on average, far more familiar with the technology
but who question the need for and desirability of fences in cyberspace.
A minuscule segment of this latter group goes still further, opposing
fences in cyberspace (whether for personal or commercial purposes)
when they disagree with the reasons for creating those fences. These
individuals are also willing to take action to assist others in circum-
venting cyberspace fences that they oppose for personal, commercial,
or ideological reasons.4" In short, the conflict between these two tradi-
tions focuses not on whether fencing in or fencing out is more appro-
priate for some aspect of cyberspace, but whether there should be
fences at all in cyberspace and, in some cases, whether anyone has a
right to erect them.
This general antipathy to the notion of fences in cyberspace is
unfortunate for two reasons. First, it tends to polarize discussion
about the regulation of cyberspace, turning it into an "us versus them"
confrontation. Second, by keeping the debate focused on whether
there should be fences or not, thoughtful consideration of the issue is
45. For example, for several years one computer consultant has been "reverse-engineering"
blocking and filtering programs intended to protect children from sexually oriented on-line con-
tent and publishing the sites disclosed through his reverse-engineering. The consultant's pro-
fessed intent is to show that many sites blocked by such programs are neither pornographic nor
offensive. See Patricia Jacobus, Free Speech Advocate Raises Ire of Filtering Firms, CNET.COM
(March 8, 2000) <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-1567022.html>.
The effects of publishing blocked sites extends beyond merely demonstrating to the general
public that certain blocking programs are overinclusive. Such publication also can enable the
operators of the blocked sites to change their Internet Protocol addresses or Uniform Resource
Locators to escape the blocking effects of the programs. Publications also can assist minors-at
least those with a modicum of computer expertise and the desire to use it-to circumvent the
programs and gain access to sexual content that their parents presumably would have wanted to
keep from them. In the latter two circumstances, the reverse engineers' actions necessarily inter-
fere in some measure with a parent's wishes to control his or her child's access to sexual
content in effect, cutting the cyberspace fences that the parent installed to fence out undesirable
content.
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forced into an overly narrow frame of reference. It is too late to say
that there should not be fences of some kind in cyberspace. People
need fences online for much the same reasons they do offline: to pro-
tect children, to shield personal data from criminal or unauthorized
use, or to simply maintain a comfortable level of personal privacy in
everyday activity.
It is in this regard that the concept of "fencing in" and "fencing
out" can be useful in exploring the relationship of law and cyberspace.
When applied to certain Internet related problems, it can help us to
understand those problems more clearly and to think through how
cyberspace law could and does allocate responsibility for implement-
ing solutions to those problems.
Take, for example, the availability of sexually oriented content
on the Net. Society in general, and parents in particular, have an
undeniable right to protect minor children from harmful materials of a
sexual nature.46 Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized "the principle that 'the parents' claim of authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the struc-
ture of our society."'" Curiously, the debate about controlling minors'
access to sexually oriented Internet content has focused exclusively on
one approach: how parents and schools can effectively block and filter
such content to keep it from children. Perhaps because the parents'
claim of authority over their minor children is so strong and compel-
ling, the debate apparently assumes that as a matter of public policy,
parents and school officials should have the primary responsibility for
"fencing out" the harmful content, and that the purveyors of the con-
tent have no responsibility for "fencing it in."
A leading commentator on cyberspace law, Lawrence Lessig,
provides one example of this mode of thinking. To deal with the
problem of online sexual content, Lessig suggests the creation of a
Web browser that disables the collection of personal information
about a user, but signals that the user is a minor. Servers with adult
material could identify the client as a kid, and thus deny access.4" Set-
ting aside the distinct possibility that an adolescent boy with moderate
knowledge of the Internet can quickly download another browser
without a "kids' mode" and visit adult sites with ease, Lessig's pro-
posal tacitly imposes on parents the primary responsibility to acquire
the browser software necessary to allow their child to surf safely. The
46. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997).
47. Id. at 865, quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
48. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501, 517 (1999).
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fence, in other words, is made more flexible, but the parents are the
only parties who bear the responsibility for putting it up and keeping
it in good repair.
It is necessary to ask whether this exclusive focus on the parents
and "fencing in" is the only way to look at the problem. Consider the
operations of adult bookstores in physical space. Society would vigor-
ously oppose an adult bookstore owner who proposed to conduct his
business from an open-air tent, where sexually oriented materials
would be visible from any direction of approach and no physical con-
straints would impede minors from coming within viewing distance.
Law and public policy routinely impose on adult bookstores the
primary responsibility for "fencing in" sexual content that could be
harmful to minors. They do so by requiring the store owners to main-
tain physical barriers in their stores and to verify the ages of patrons,
so that minors who might enter the store are nonetheless prevented
from viewing sexual materials. The bookstore owners, in effect, bear
the primary responsibility for "fencing in" the harmful content, and
"fencing out" the class of individuals who should not have contact
with that content. In that situation, society has weighed the relative
harms-the diminution of commerce in sexually oriented material
versus damage to "the physical and psychological well-being of
minors" 9 -and made its decision about which harm more urgently
needs to be avoided.
A similar analysis with respect to online sexual content would
help to foster a new perspective on the problem. In this analysis, we
need to weigh the relative potential harms to adult content merchants
and minors in light of our ability to control and direct the architectures
we create for cyberspace.5 0 We must then consider whether the alloca-
tion of responsibility can be shifted, consistent with constitutional
values, in two ways: first, by explicitly choosing who should bear
primary responsibility for "fencing in" or "fencing out" to avoid the
greater harm, and second, by requiring the adoption of mechanisms,
such as software or legal standards, to accomplish that purpose."
49. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). See Reno, 521
U.S. at 865.
50. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 48, at 506.
51. One recent media report notes that various "adult sites," including sites that facilitate
alcohol sales, gambling, and pornography, are referring users to adult verification systems. Some
of these systems "purportedly accept birth certificates or other documents as proof." Lynn
Voedisch, You Must Be 18 to Enter, CNN.COM (Jan. 17, 2000) <http://cnn.com/2000/TECH/
computing/01/17/are.you.18.idg/index.html>. Some critics charge that such systems are no
more than "scams," where sites do nothing more than ask the person seeking to enter the site
whether they are at least 18 and seek no independent verification of the person's response. See
id. In any event, the existence of sites that accept physical documentation of age indicates that it
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Another type of Internet conduct where the "fencing" concept is
applicable is crime that involves continued interaction between a crim-
inal and a victim. Fraud and cyberstalking 2 are types of crime in
which the victim often (though not always) has had some voluntary
contact with the criminal at the outset, even if the victim does not
realize the criminal's true purpose until later."3 In other words, the
fraudulent content that the criminal directs at the victim does not have
characteristics that most observers would readily identify as offensive
or harmful, unlike sexual content, which does have readily identifiable
harmful or offensive characteristics. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, for an individual to "fence out" fraudulent content
through the use of software unless he or his Internet service provider
(ISP) blocks or filters all "spam" 4 and he avoids visiting chat rooms
and message boards altogether.
Moreover, the nature of the relationship between a criminal and a
victim is wholly different from the relatively arm's-length relationship
that exists between a commercial content provider and a prospective
consumer. Unlike the commercial provider, there is no legitimate
harm to the criminal that law and public policy must take into
account. The law's only concern in determining who should be
responsible for "fencing in" or "fencing out" fraudulent content, is the
victim's economic and related loss.S The law therefore appropriately
places the responsibility solely on the criminal, imposing criminal
sanctions on anyone who disseminates content on the Internet with the
may not be an undue burden for sexual content sites to adopt measures more likely to ensure that
minors will consistently be denied access to those sites.
52. Cyberstalking, for purposes of this discussion, can be defined as any effort to use the
Internet to carry out the types of activities that stalkers conduct in physical space, such as direct
contact with the victim or surveillance of the victim's activities. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CYBERSTALKING (1999).
53. In many cases, Internet fraud and cyberstalking can be conducted without any prior
contact between criminal and victim. Some forms of Internet fraud, such as credit card fraud,
may involve hacking into insecure e-commerce Web sites and downloading credit card numbers
for later use at other sites. Similarly, cyberstalking can involve the purchase of personal data,
such as Social Security numbers, from commercial Web sites without the knowledge or consent
of the person to whom that number is assigned. See, e.g., Net Stalking Victims Tell Their Tales,
MSNBC (March 28, 2000) <http://www.msnbc.com/news/388008.asp>.
54. "Spai" is a verb defined as sending "copies of the same message to large numbers of
newsgroups or users on the Internet. People sparn the Internet to advertise products as well as to
broadcast some political or social commentary." TECH ENCYCLOPEDIA (visited Dec. 1, 2000)
<http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia>.
55. It has become clear to law enforcement authorities in recent years that the impact of
white-collar crime often extends well beyond the victim's direct economic losses. Fraud victims
have reported other significant effects, including depression and loss of trust in others. See, e.g.,
UNITED STATES-CANADA WORKING GROUP ON TELEMARKETING FRAUD, REPORT (1997).
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intent to defraud. In effect, the law requires that all online individuals
"fence in" any content that has a fraudulent purpose.
The concept of fencing does not necessarily mean that the gov-
ernment is required to regulate by specifying or developing the type of
fencing. Take, for example, the recent spate of distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks against a number of e-commerce sites."6 One
tell-tale sign of a DDoS attack is the sending of "spoofed packets,"
which are comprised of digital data that contains legitimate destination
addresses but appear to originate from an illegitimate source within a
particular network. Networks and ISPs that want to reduce the risk of
receiving spoofed packets are using filtering technology that stops
spoofed packets from making their way onto the Internet.5 7
One organization has already developed and made available at no
cost to the public an antispoofing test tool, which allows users to test
whether their filters are working properly. 8 This action, along with
recent efforts by private-sector organizations to combine their efforts
with regard to Internet security, show that the private sector can
accomplish things through collective action, without government
intervention or direction. Indeed, we might even say that this type of
collective action is in the tradition of the Old West, as it is reminiscent
of the cooperative and mutually supportive actions of open-range
cattlemen.
We need to pause here, though, to clarify what we mean when
we refer to fences in cyberspace. Although one might think that the
only kind of fence we can create in cyberspace consists of bits and
bytes, such a belief is premised on certain assumptions about the
nature of cyberspace itself. These assumptions must be examined
with care if we are to explore the relationship between law and cyber-
space more completely. Part III will provide the outlines of that
examination.
56. A DDoS attack consists of the coordinated launch of a large number of messages from
multiple computers to a particular network or computer. The purpose of this attack is to over-
whelm the network or computer with so many messages that it slows or completely interrupts
service at that network or computer. See "denial of service attack," TECHENCYCLOPEDIA
(visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia>. In February 2000, a spate of
DDoS attacks felled a number of leading e-commerce websites, such as Amazon.com, Dell, eBay,
and Yahoo! Ultimately, Canadian authorities arrested and charged a 15-year-old boy, who is
suspected of having used at least 54 computers to launch the coordinated attacks. See Canada
Broadens Its Case Against Suspected Hacker, N.Y. TIMES.COM (Aug. 4, 2000) <http://www.
search 1.nytimes.com/search/daily/b. . .+cyber-lib+cyber-lib+8725+0+wAAA+Mafiaboy>
(visited Sept. 8, 2000).
57. See <http://www.icsa.net>.
58. See id.
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III. Cyberspace, Physical Space, and Moral Choices
One critical aspect of the conflict between legal and nonlegal
traditions in cyberspace is that defenders of the nonlegal tradition, as
well as supporters of the legal tradition, routinely treat the concept of
cyberspace as reality, not metaphor. In their view, cyberspace is truly
a place different from the world we knew before the creation of the
Internet. Several of the leading scholars in cyberspace law have lent
support to this view by asserting that cyberspace is literally a separate"place" or "space, "" or referring to cyberspace as a "new space"
distinct from "real space" or from "a space that we have inhabited."6"
The cyberspace-as-new-space metaphor is an integral element in
some of the prevailing legal interpretations of cyberspace. In essence,
it provides the foundation-particularly an explicit major premise and
an implied minor premise-of a syllogism that those interpretations
appear to have adopted. That syllogism is as follows:
(1) Cyberspace is a space or place different from real space (the
explicit major premise);
(2) Laws that regulate conduct in real space cannot effectively
regulate conduct in cyberspace (the inarticulate minor
premise); and
(3) Therefore, we must either refrain from applying these
ineffective real-space laws to cyberspace, or devise new laws
or modes of regulation that can effectively regulate
cyberspace.
Acceptance of the so-called "separateness" of cyberspace also
encourages an inference that the character of cyberspace law must
differ from the character of law governing real space.61
59. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996).
60. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744 (1995). See also,
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 3, 13 (1997). While
Lessig disagrees strongly with Johnson's and Post's notion that cyberspace constitutes a place
separate from real space and beyond the reach of real-space government, his writings have some-
times failed to make clear whether he considers the regulatory forces of cyberspace to be else-
where than real space. See Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of
Code, SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 717-18 (1998). More recently, Lessig definitively stated
that "[c]yberspace is not a place," then immediately went on to describe it in spatial terms as"many places." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 63 (1999). A
fuller consideration of Lessig's views, which richly deserve such consideration, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
61. See David R. Johnson and David Post, supra note 59, at 1379, 1381.
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Several features of these interpretations are troublesome. First,
the notion of cyberspace's "separateness" from physical space involves
an assumption about physical reality for which its proponents offer no
empirical support. This notion can have a profound consequence for
legal analysis.6 2 If it is assumed that the nature of cyberspace is truly
distinct from that of physical space, then we literally could not count
on principles we are accustomed to applying in the real world, such as
physics-or law. We would have to treat even the most basic
activities in cyberspace as though we had no experience with them and
develop new legal concepts to address cyberspace issues without refer-
ence to real-world legal concepts.
The perception of cyberspace as separate from real space also
tends to encourage a belief that cyberspace is an actual jurisdiction
separate from the polities that exist in real space and, therefore, should
be governed in ways that traditional political processes cannot be
trusted to handle. 3  Finally, it should not be surprising that if we
accept the notion that there is a clear difference between physical space
and cyberspace, we may be more inclined to believe that mechanisms
that function in the physical world, such as fences, cannot have effec-
tive counterparts in the cyberspace world.
The lack of empirical evidence of cyberspace's "separateness"
from physical space suggests that we need to make our own observa-
tions of cyberspace and collect empirical evidence. Gathering this
kind of evidence about the nature and operation of cyberspace serves
to improve our understanding of it, as well as our ability to make law
relating to it. Because computers increasingly blur the distinction
between physics and psychology,64 these two fields may be the most
appropriate to inform and guide our observations.
1. Physics
It takes no great knowledge of physics to understand that every
component of computers and the Internet-right down to the silicon,
62. See ROBERT G. SACHS, THE PHYSICS OF TIME REVERSAL 1 (1987).
63. At a "Junior Summit" conducted at MIT in 1998, for example, 94 teenaged delegates
from around the world endorsed the concept of "Nation1 ," a so-called "cybercountry" stemming
from a Website oriented toward teenagers. Participants discussed principles for building a
"cybernation" separate from individual physical nations: as one delegate put it, "We need to
populate the country before we can change the world.... It takes more than a week to build a
country. We've only just begun." "Junior Summit" Endorses New Nation (Nov. 24, 1998)
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/,4586,2168911,00.html>. For a classic statement
of the belief that cyberspace constitutes an area beyond the authority of government in real
physical space, see John Perry Barlow, The Declaration (Feb. 8, 1996), reprinted in SALON
<http://www.salonmagazine.com/08/features/declaration.html>.
64. See SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF 61 (1984).
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copper, and plastic in our home computers-consists of the same
physical elements as everything else on Earth. Every e-mail we send
or receive, every Web page we access, works because the electrons or
photons at work on the Internet are exactly the same as those we find
in every other aspect of the physical world. Furthermore, the sym-
metry of physical laws that quantum physics has helped to establish"
operates exactly the same way for cyberspace as it does for the rest of
the physical world.
One can see whether the symmetry of physical laws applies to
cyberspace by conducting a "thought experiment" that involves an
imaginary computer with a wireless connection to the Internet. There
are four symmetry operations in physics that are relevant at this scale:
(a) Translation in Time. Translation in time involves a proc-
ess whereby one builds the computer and starts it, and
then builds the same computer three days later and starts it
at the same time in exactly the same condition; holding all
other features of the environment the same, the two com-
puters will go through the same actions in exactly the same
way.66 Common experience with computers shows that
there would be no change in this computer's operation in
relation to the Internet. Whether one built it today or
three days from now, it would work exactly the same.
(b) Translation in Space. Translation in space involves a proc-
ess whereby, if one starts an apparatus at certain coordi-
nates in space and translates it to new coordinates, the laws
of physics do not change. 6' Here, too, the computer and
its Internet connection will function exactly the same,
whether one moves it side to side, up and down, in a circle,
or upside down.
(c) Uniform Velocity in a Straight Line. Uniform velocity in a
straight line involves a process whereby, if one has an
apparatus working a certain way and then moves it and all
relevant surroundings at a uniform velocity in a straight
line, the laws of physics will not change.68 As many of us
may have seen on airplane or train travel while we or
65. Quantum physicists define "symmetry" as a property of matter if it can be subjected to
a certain operation and appears exactly the same after the operation as before. See RICHARD P.
FEYNMAN, Six NOT-SO-EASY PIECES 1 (1997).
66. See id. at 25.
67. Seeid. at 5.
68. See id. at 25-26.
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others were using laptops, this operation also holds true for
computers and Internet use.
(d) Rotation in Space. Rotation in space involves a process
whereby, if one turns a thing in space at an angle and turns
everything else that is relevant along with it, the laws of
physics will be unchanged.69 Here, too, the physical laws
would stay the same for the computer while connected to
the Internet, regardless of the direction or dimension of
rotation.
This thought experiment is meant to suggest a proposition that
physicists and engineers would think obvious but that some cyberlaw
scholars might think heretical: that at all points of its existence and
operation, cyberspace is part of physical space and it functions in
perfect accordance with the laws of physics that govern the real world.
2. Psychology
When we turn to the field of psychology, we also find that people
behave in cyberspace in accordance with the same principles of psy-
chology that govern their offline behavior. For example, as I have
described in a paper on the social engineering of Internet fraud,7" peo-
ple who become victims of online fraud schemes are susceptible to the
same modes of psychological influence that criminals have employed
for many years in traditional fraud schemes-such as authority, con-
sistency, scarcity, and social proof.71
Admittedly, the technology of the Internet makes it possible to
depict events in ways that make it more difficult to distinguish
between fact and fiction.72 It also has fostered the development of new
modes of online social interaction (such as chat rooms) that criminals
can exploit in ways different from their customary methods. How-
ever, the tools of social influence and deception that criminals use, and
the types of vulnerabilities that they seek in their victims, remain the
same in both the online and offline contexts.
These conclusions-that cyberspace is not separate from physical
space and that our online behavior accords with the psychological
69. Seeid. at 9, 25.
70. See Jonathan J. Rusch, The "Social Engineering" ofInternet Fraud, Paper at the Internet
Society Conference, San Jose, California (June 24, 1999) reprinted at <http://www.isoc,org/
inet99/proceedings/3g/3g2.htm>.
71. See Jonathan J. Rusch, Testimony Before the United States Sentencing Commission
(Feb. 10, 1998) (copy on file with the author). See also, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (rev. ed. 1993).
72. See, e.g., Dianne Lynch, Stalking Web Sites, ABCNEWS.COM, (March 22, 2000)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/WiredWomen/wiredwomen.htlm>.
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principles governing offline behavior-have two interesting implica-
tions for our examination of law and cyberspace. For one thing, they
vitiate the argument that rules in cyberspace must necessarily differ
from those in the physical world because cyberspace is different, or
new space. In certain respects, they suggest that there should be a
presumption against crafting different rules for cyberspace conduct,
absent a compelling justification. Secondly, they suggest that as we
devise new types of fences in cyberspace to protect personal privacy,
we may not realize that in the process, we are implicitly making
choices that have moral and psychological ramifications.
For example, in response to the swell of public concern about
protecting personal privacy, several companies are now offering anon-
ymizing programs that purport to make the user's path untraceable as
he wends his way through the Internet. Some of these programs even
offer users a function that enables them to adopt one or more separate
online identities.73 Individuals clearly ought to have mechanisms
enabling them to retain control over identifying data or other personal
data that others may seek to acquire from them online. It is under-
standable that some people may wish to be anonymous if they are
behaving lawfully as passive observers of certain Web content and
they wish simply to avoid leaving traces of who they are or where they
have been.
The debate on this issue, however, tends to define the problem
solely in terms of the right to anonymity, as though there were a
single, unqualified, absolute right. We need to be precise about the
terms we use to describe and categorize online conduct. When the
debate turns, in part, on a person's claim that he has a right to use
programs that facilitate the creation of online identities other than his
real identity, we must accept that we are now speaking of a right to
pseudonymity, and to the creation of a morally problematic type of
cyberspace fence. When we choose to adopt false names and identities
in order to interact with others online, we are-whether we are
prepared to accept it or not-making moral choices.
Barbed wire fences do not purport to be anything other than
what they appear to be. Selection of false identities, on the other hand,
clearly involves holding oneself out to be someone and something that
one is not. When we do so with the intention to mislead or deceive
someone else, Sissela Bok has cogently argued, we cannot evade the
fact that we are lying. 4
73. See Zero Knowledge Systems, Freedom (visited Sept. 8, 2000) <http://www.freedom.
net>.
74. See SISSELA BOK, LYING 6, 7 (1978) [hereinafter BOK, LYING]. Bok, a distinguished
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We all can imagine circumstances in which we might consider
lying about ourselves or our personal identities to someone we
encounter online. We might, for example, consider giving an online
news site false names and false background information if we want
access to the resources of that site but are annoyed by the intrusiveness
of the site's demands for our personal information. The problem is
that under any circumstances, when we lie-when, that is, we make
statements with the intent to mislead or deceive7 -we are arrogating
to ourselves a certain power at the expense of the power of the person
we are deceiving.76 We enable ourselves to misinform that person, to
obscure our true objective, or to eliminate or withdraw alternatives
that that person might want to preserve in weighing the costs and
benefits of some course of action. 7
Moreover, when we lie, we also lay claim to a free-rider status
with respect to the rest of society. We choose to lie to others, but do
not want to be deceived ourselves. We therefore insist that others be
honest with us, even as we are dishonest with them.78 The problem is
that as each of us individually decides to follow this approach, we
begin to create a tragedy of the commons79 in cyberspace. As Bok put
it, "If enough persons adopt the free-rider strategy for lying, the time
will come when all will feel pressed to survive."80
Furthermore, we need to consider not only the liar's perspective,
but also the perspective of the deceived. Should that person learn that
she has been deceived, she is likely to feel betrayed, resentful, manipu-
lated, suspicious of others who would deal with her in future, and
mistrustful of the environment in which the deception occurred."1 She
may not perceive, or will be less inclined to assume, that others might
want to deal honestly with her in that environment in the future. In
addition, if the deception limits or distorts the choices that the
deceived makes for other people, those people feel the adverse effects
of the lie and come to share the deceived's perspective even if they are
never direct recipients of the lie. 2
philosopher and author, has written several books that explore the moral and ethical dimensions
of various features of modem society. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, MAYHEM (1999); SISSELA BOK,
SECRECY (1982). See also Randy Cohen, The Gift That Keeps On Giving, N.Y. TIMES MAGA-
ZINE, June 4, 2000, at 37.
75. See BOK, LYING, supra note 74, at 14.
76. Seeid. at 20.
77. See id. at 20-21.
78. See id. at 24.
79. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
80. SISSELA BOK, supra note 74, at 25 n.*.
81. See id. at 21-22.
82. Seeid. at 22-23.
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Finally, those who are inclined to defend systematic lying to
others in cyberspace do not take account of the fact that liars
usually weigh only the immediate harm to others from the lie
against the benefits they want to achieve. The flaw in such an
outlook is that it ignores or underestimates two additional kinds
of harm-the harm that lying does to the liars themselves and
the harm done to the general level of trust and social coopera-
tion. Both are cumulative; both are hard to reverse.83
For these reasons, in both "real space" and cyberspace interac-
tions, we need to adopt a presumption against lying, and to favor
truthful statements over lies, in the absence of special considerations.
When a situation arises where lying is a possible choice, we need first
to seek truthful alternatives, and "only where a lie is a last resort can
one even begin to consider whether it is morally justified." 4
The importance of extending the presumption against lying to
cyberspace should be self-evident once we recognize that cyberspace is
part of the real world. When we blindly encourage the creation and
spread of fences in cyberspace that are premised on the deception of
others, we inadvertently make choices about what kind of cyberspace
we want for ourselves, our children, our friends, and our colleagues.
In the very short term, of course, our options for protecting our per-
sonal privacy may be more limited. We are given the choice between
feeling confident about surfing the Net by adopting a false identity, or
worrying that wrongdoers may try to acquire our personal data and
turn it to their own malign purposes if we surf with truthful identify-
ing data. Considering the risks, many people do not hesitate to opt for
what they consider to be an excusable or white lie.
We can, however, try to encourage the development of other
mechanisms--other types of fences-that will allow us to retain con-
trol of truthful personal data, no matter where we venture on the Net,
without having to deceive others. One model for this approach is a
recently publicized browser plug-in that discriminates between "first-
party cookies" (that is, cookies that come from the site one is visiting
at that moment) and "third-party cookies" (that is, cookies coming
from other servers that one has not visited). This tool reportedly
allows the user to choose different levels of security for his personal
data by blocking no cookies, third-party cookies, or all cookies.85 The
virtue of this concept is that it does not require us to lie to move in
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 32-33 (emphasis in original).
85. See D. Ian Hopper, New Tool Offers Privacy Without Crippling Browsing Habits,
CNN.COM (March 21, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/03121/iccide>.
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cyberspace; it allows us not only to "fence in" our personal data but
also to alter the size of the fence to fit different circumstances and
needs. We need to encourage the development of other types of
cyberspace fences with similar concepts, so that lying does not have to
become a routine part of our social interactions on the Internet.
CONCLUSION
As we move into the next century, we need to reorient our think-
ing about cyberspace law. First of all, we need to accept that, for the
foreseeable future, our thinking about law and its relation to the Inter-
net must be tentative, provisional, and constantly shifting-much like
the Internet itself. The headlong pace of advances in Net related tech-
nologies, and the likelihood that the Net before long will have more
than "twenty-two sides" to it, will make it difficult to do otherwise.
We also need to remember, as a Tom Stoppard character put it,
that "language is as capable of obscuring the truth as of revealing it.""
It is necessary to identify the metaphors that have become common-
place in Internet culture and subject them to critical examination in
order to fortify the rigor of our thinking about cyberspace and cyber-
space law. A more comprehensive examination of these metaphors
deserves inclusion on a cyberspace law research agenda.
Finally, we need to recognize that one of the major challenges for
cyberspace law will be to foster greater acceptance of the concept that
fences in cyberspace are not invariably "the devil's hatband." If "the
Internet is for everyone," as Vinton Cerf stated, 7 we must continue to
provide more robust mechanisms for "fencing in" or "fencing out," as
appropriate, so that the growing online population can be confident
that what it considers valuable will be protected and that which can
cause harm if left unrestrained will be restrained. Our ability to pro-
vide those mechanisms, through software and through law and legal
institutions, will be one measure of how well we are making sense of
cyberspace and making sensible law for cyberspace.
86. Tom Stoppard, Professional Foul sc. 5, in EVERY GOOD Boy DESERVES FAVOR AND
PROFESSIONAL FOUL 75 (1978).
87. Vinton Cerf, The Internet Is for Everyone, Speech at Computers, Freedom & Privacy
Conference (April 7, 1999), reprinted at <http:/www.isoc.org/isoc/media/speeches/
foreveryone.shtml>.
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